The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDV Act) is a landmark legislation that provides comprehensive civil protection to women who are or have been in domestic relationships and have experienced domestic violence. Domestic violence under the Act is broadly defined to include physical, sexual, verbal, emotional, and economic abuse. The Act's remedies — administered by Magistrates — are civil in nature and are designed to be swift, accessible, and effective without requiring the woman to initiate criminal prosecution.
Who can file, and against whom: Any "aggrieved person" — defined as a woman who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the respondent and alleges domestic violence — can file an application under the Act, and Section 12(1) equally allows a Protection Officer, or any other person acting on her behalf, to present that application. On the respondent’s side the bare Act still reads any adult male person who is or has been in a domestic relationship with her [Section 2(q)], and the proviso to that clause extends the complaint of an aggrieved wife or a woman in a relationship in the nature of marriage to a relative of the husband or the male partner. That is narrower than the loose formulation "any male member of the household" which one often hears: the person complained against must stand in a domestic relationship, or be such a relative. In Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora (2016), the Supreme Court struck down the restriction limiting respondents to males, so a complaint against female relatives of the husband is maintainable even though the words "adult male person" still sit unamended in the statute book.
Types of relief, and which section carries which: The five reliefs sit in five separate sections, and pleading them under the wrong one is the drafting error that costs an applicant time. (1) Protection Order [Section 18] prohibits the respondent from committing or abetting domestic violence, from entering the aggrieved person’s place of employment or a child’s school or any other place she frequents, from attempting to communicate with her in any form, from alienating assets or operating bank accounts and lockers — her stridhan included — and from causing violence to her dependants or to anyone assisting her. What Section 18 does not do is keep the respondent out of the shared household; that relief lives in the next section. (2) Residence Order [Section 19(1)] is where the household itself is dealt with: restraining dispossession or disturbance of her possession whether or not the respondent has any legal or equitable interest in it (clause a), directing him to remove himself from it (clause b, which the proviso forbids against a woman), restraining him or his relatives from entering the portion in which she resides (clause c), restraining alienation or encumbrance of the household (clause d), or directing him to secure alternate accommodation of the same level, or to pay the rent for it (clause f). Section 19(8) additionally lets the Magistrate direct the return of her stridhan or other property. (3) Monetary Relief [Section 20(1)] covers loss of earnings, medical expenses, the loss caused by destruction, damage or removal of property from her control, and maintenance for her and her children. Clause (d) still speaks of maintenance "under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"; that Code has since been repealed by Section 531(1) of the BNSS, 2023, so the provision to be read with it now is Section 144 BNSS. (4) Custody Order [Section 21] gives temporary custody of the children, and the proviso obliges the Magistrate to refuse the respondent’s visit where a visit would be harmful to the child. (5) Compensation Order [Section 22] is for compensation and damages for the injuries, mental torture and emotional distress included.
Interim and ex parte orders — what Section 23 actually requires: The test is not "imminent danger". Under Section 23(2) the Magistrate must be satisfied that the application prima facie discloses that the respondent is committing, or has committed, an act of domestic violence, or that there is a likelihood of his committing one, and the ex parte order under Sections 18 to 22 is then passed on the basis of the affidavit of the aggrieved person in the prescribed form. Because the section makes that affidavit the basis of the order, an application which does not carry one leaves the Magistrate nothing to act upon before notice. Section 23(1), separately, allows any interim order the Magistrate thinks just and proper once the proceeding is before him.
The right to reside in the shared household: Section 17 of the PWDV Act gives every woman in a domestic relationship the right to reside in the shared household regardless of whether she has any right, title, or beneficial interest in it. The Supreme Court in Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja (2020) held that a woman can assert her right under Section 17 even against the property of her parents-in-law.
Criminal remedies alongside the Act: The PWDV Act's civil remedies do not preclude criminal remedies. A woman can simultaneously file: (i) a complaint under Section 85 BNS (erstwhile Section 498A IPC) for cruelty by husband or relatives; (ii) a complaint for dowry demands under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The Protection Officer appointed under the PWDV Act assists the aggrieved person in preparing applications and monitoring compliance with Magistrate's orders.